Chris Preble on U.S. Foreign Policy, #ORadio

Ostrolenk speaks with Chris Preble, Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at Cato Institute and author of Peace, War, and Liberty. Preble begins by discussing our Founding Fathers’ vision for U.S. Foreign Policy, specifically the Constitution’s called for a standing Navy, but the ability to raise an Army. This is an important distinction, meant to limit the United States’ tendency to go to war; a deviation from the U.S. Government’s current interpretation and use of war powers. Washington in his Farewell Address warned of alliances and the internal disputes of foreign countries and how we rectify this with the territorial expansion common of the U.S. at the time. Preble and Ostrolenk further discuss the now permanent war state reflected in our current approach to foreign policy and the costs to American of this approach. To learn more about Chris Preble’s work, visit Cato’s website and find his book.

Bydlak on a Guide to a Strong America, #ORadio

Ostrolenk speaks to Jonathan Bydlak, Founder and President for the Institute for Spending Reform. Bydlak begins by detailing the importance of evaluating spending in all areas of Government, and how this was the impetus behind his recent work – a Guide for a Strong America, which looks at spending reform at the Pentagon. Ostrolenk and Bydlak then discuss the five sections of Bydlak’s report: acquisition, veteran services, personnel, infrastructure, and foreign policy. To learn more about Bydlak’s work, visit their website and read the guide at The guide is dynamic and will present new ideas as they are developed.

Lessons learned from the F-35 with Dan Grazier, #ORadio

Ostrolenk continues his conversation with Dan Grazier, Jack Shanahan Fellow with the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), on the F-35. The F-35 is back in the news following two key events: its bombing missions in Afghanistan and a crash in South Carolina. Grazier updates the audience on current production levels of the F-35, as well as the ongoing issues with its operations, noting that although many issues are known, simulations are insufficient at providing insight into the F-35’s capacity against enemy aircraft. Grazier also touches upon why the F-35 remains the wrong aircraft for many of the US’s operational needs as it is built for too narrow of a purpose. Grazier concludes on lessons learned upon which he hopes we can build more successful aircraft programs.